Peter McLaren is a key figure in the development of revolutionary critical pedagogy. In this paper I engage critically with some of the core themes of this book: historical Jesus, the dialectic of love and hate, cognition and consciousness, capitalist abstraction and revolutionary theory. I want to avoid the type of hagiography that sometimes accompanies
McLaren's work. There are examples in the opening sections, according him mystical powers: 'While of his age, he also transcends it' (Peters xxiv); and speaking about the book 'as a testimony to an examined life in the service of humanity' (Juan Jr xv). This impression of saintliness is not helped when McLaren claims to know that agnostics and atheists 'hunger... for a spiritual connection to that which speaks to us outside of ourselves' (43).
The book is at its best when it considers the nature of 'cosmic intelligence' (McLaren 2015 396) , suggesting a sense of order amenable to human reason beyond the 'social universe' (313), and at its worst when it claims that God is 'unknowable' (403), as if being resigned to ignorance can ever be part of a revolutionary project.
The book, to its credit, is full of 'Marxist shit' (7). McLaren knows enough about Marxism to
give top billing to Marx's theory of value and the need to abolish capitalism, but his commitment to value theory is undermined by his attachment to a number of other Marxisms, all of which drain Marx of its revolutionary intent (Anderson 1976 ). The use of Gramsci's concept of the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic (154), gives too much to the idea that capital is a discursive ideology and Althusser's 'ideological state apparatuses' (19) fixes Marxism as a form of sociological structural functionalism (Clarke 1980) , both of which are a long way from critical social theory. This is further devalued by his commitment to the liberal concept of equality, as if it was ever anything more than a bourgeois concept derived from imperatives of the capitalist markets (Pashukanis 1978 , Mieville 2005 .This surfeit of subversive phraseology might work as a rhetorical device, but undermines any scholarly exegesis of Marx's revolutionary theory. There are consequences for McLaren's claim to be both 'multiperspectival and 'dialectical' (McLaren 2015 312) , limiting his capacity to sustain a critical critique. I am not suggesting a dogmatic Marxism, but a more systematic exegesis of Marx's work is required if we are to follow the prompting of one of McLaren's inspirations and rethink 'the meaning of his (Marx's) legacy for the realities of our times' (Hudis 2012 215) .
McLaren writes about the crisis of capitalism (McLaren 2015 373) , with suggestions for how this crisis might be managed and alleviated, e.g., by creating cooperatives and learning from anti-colonial and indigenous struggles in Latin America and elsewhere, based on the notions of Buen Vivir ( 93) and Pachamama ( 93), including struggles alongside non-humans (35).
What is missing from his work is a theory of crisis: a sense of how 'the juggernaut' (302) of capitalism is prone to self-destructive dynamic tendencies is not considered. The world might be on the point of destruction, but there is no sense that Capital, following the logic of its own anachronistic capabilities, has reached a stage where its strategies for extracting surplus value have become exhausted, so that neoliberalism and even Capital have lost the capacity for expansive valorisation (Postone 1993 , Kurz 2014 ). This leaves a dominant capital to be undermined by, as McLaren puts it, the '"onto-creative process of becoming fully human…' (McLaren 2015 12,) through uncovering 'Jesus' message of love and justice' so as to 'integrate this message into the field of revolutionary critical pedagogy...bringing about an alternative to value production, and in so doing, participating in our own redemption' (13). I make no claim to be a biblical scholar but would want to make a methodological point, the recovery of Jesus as an historical figure is one thing, but to claim the historical Jesus as a transhistorical exemplar of universal values is another, and a complete anathema to any historical materialist methodology (Gunn 1981) .
So how can we get beyond the idea of Christian socialism and Marxism as political myths, in a way that substantiates the claims for Marxism and understands the significant nature of religious spirituality as a dominant force in contemporary life and something more than a mental aberration? The answer can be found in Marx's critique of the critique of religion and, more generally, in his theory of abstraction (Toscano 2010 , Toscano 2010a . Initially, following Feuerbach, Marx argued that God is the power of humanity in an alienated form, as an example of false consciousness, to support the subordination of populations by the clergy, religious institutions and other authoritarian political regimes. In later work Marx argues that alienation is not the result of a mental abstraction but is substantiated by the abstraction of labour: a social phenomenon, revealed as an historical and material entity operating like a force of nature in the world of time and space. The epitome of this process of capitalist abstraction is Money as the supreme form of social power (Clarke 1988) . The suprasensual aspect of Money provides the intellectual space for the logical creation of a God in the form of a transcendental power without acknowledging its material social substance. God, like Money, is a real abstraction (Toscano 2005) . Money is the materialised representative on earth of Capital, which exists as an automatic historical subject without an ego or a consciousness (Postone 1993 77) .
The basis for Marx' theory of abstraction is set out in the first chapter of Capital Volume 1 where he establishes the commodity form as the organising principle for capitalist civilisation (Lukacs 1971 , Postone 1993 . The commodity form is the unity of the determinations of value: use and exchange, where the concrete utility of a commodity is overwhelmed by the imperative of capitalist exchange as part of an expansive cycle for the production of surplus value. Marx's main contribution to social science is to reveal the substance of value and its expansionary capacity as abstract labour, which acts like an impersonal form of social domination. The abstraction of labour (or value in motion) provides the basis for the social relations of production in capitalist society: the imposition of waged work, along with its dynamic and measure (socially necessary labour time) and logic for antagonisms (class struggle). This social process takes place without the need for Capital's characters to be aware of its real nature, while playing central roles in the organisation of manufacture (capitalists) as exploited labour (workers) and as the actors by which the exchange value of commodities is realised (consumers). Money has its own roles to play, not only as the universal form of exchange value, but the instrument through which the expansionary logic of the capitalist universe is maintained. In this sense Money might be likened to a sort of transcendental subject (Sohn-Rethel 1978) . This is much more than an economic system; but, rather, a social synthetic system or web or life dominated by the logic of abstraction (Adorno 1962 . It really is the case that 'In capitalist society abstraction swamps rationality' (Kay and Mott 1982) . This recovery of Marx as a theory of abstraction has been developed to include a Marxist theory of money and the state (Clarke 1991) , history and time (Postone 1993 ) as a critique of the critique of religion (Toscano 2010 ) and even as a materialist theory of cognition (Sohn-Rethel 1978) .
McLaren is interested in cognition and its relationship to revolutionary critical pedagogy.
Enjoined with 'religious pilgrims on a spiritual path...we have tried to make our own consciousness the object of our thought. We have tried to bolster our potential to think about This discussion about violence and hate is compelling, but it is not what Benjamin means by divine violence (Benjamin 1986 (Benjamin /1921 . Benjamin divides political violence between the mythic and divine, the former is political and state-law creating ('bloody power over mere life for its own sake'), while the latter is proletarian and state-law destroying ('pure power over all life for the sake of the living') (Benjamin 1986 297) Zizek, thinking about his own profession, argues that sometimes it is better to do nothing, rather than engage in 'pseudo-activity... to mask the nothingness of what goes on... academics participate in meaningless debates... Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do ' (2008: 183) , and could involve 'withdrawing to a solitary place to learn, learn, learn' (7).
McLaren is right about many things, not least the need for a revolutionary theory and action that supports the abolition of capitalism understood through value form theory and radical love (McLaren 2015 370). However, radical love must include radical hate for the magic of dialectics to work. Not a personal or pathological hate, but a hate for capitalist civilisation; this is fundamental to the structure and meaning of absolute negativity. This radical dialectical framework demands radical action along the lines that McLaren suggests, including setting up cooperatives and learning from struggles against colonialism. But, given the nature of what is at stake, the radical love-hate dialectic must contain the element of radical doubt, sustained, not by the assurance of revolutionary critical pedagogy, but by the pedagogical framework of Benjamin's educative power. I want to extend educative power beyond Benjamin's realm of deep contemplation and fix it as a central part of Marx's methodology, as a form of critical practical reflexivity (Gunn 1989 6, Neary 2015 . The key to critical practical reflexivity, and what takes it beyond McLaren's own version of self-reflection (McLaren 2015 47) , is to engender a critical process which calls into question the validity of its own categories based on the historical material context out of which they have emerged.
Marx has already supplied the template for money as the 'universal equivalent' and the supreme form of social power in Capital 1, and shown how other capitalist categories can be included in the analysis, including God and Humanity, as complementary forms of the value relation. It is only by fixing these categories, or real abstractions, in their actual social substance that they can be disabled of their social power and stripped of their authority. But more than that even, this framework allows us to uncover abstract thought itself as the outcome of a process of real abstraction. It is by extending the discussion to consider the nature of cognition that I would like to make use of McLaren's concept of 'cosmic intelligence' (McLaren 2015 396) , not in the sense of an extraneous transcendental unknowable omnipotent power, but as the process through which we come to know ourselves in 'the universe as a whole ' (Huxley 1927 135) .This focus on the cosmic could be extended to include the study of other monotheistic religions, Islam and Judaism, whose deities also take the form of abstractions (Toscano 2010) . Cosmic intelligence is not the promotion of science over religion but the application of critical practical reflexivity against the abstract assumptions of capitalist science, and particularly the separations between the humanities and the natural sciences, to create 'One Science' (Marx 1975 355, Neary 2016 ).The purpose of developing our cosmic intelligence is not the affirmation of humanity, the humanities and positivistic natural sciences along with other forms of religiosity based on the logic of capitalist abstractions, nor to restrict our revolutionary ambition within the confines of 'the unknowable'; but to declare ourselves, all of us and all of it, as an intrinsic part of an ordered universe, of life-enhancing life to be lived now and forever.
